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Jerry Brodsky*
T HIS ARTICLE EXAMINES the right of a liability insurer to con-
trol the defense of its insured, the duty owed to him in
defending or settling an action brought against him, and liability
for negligence in defending the suit. Special attention is given
to the conflict of interests which may confront an attorney re-
tained by an insurance company to defend an action brought
against a policyholder.
Right to Control the Defense
Generally, a liability insurer has exclusive control over the
defense of claims against the insured, and the policyholder must
relinquish control of the defense,' as provided for in the contract
of insurance. Ordinarily, the insurer is an independent contrac-
tor,2 however, the modem rule is that the insurer becomes the
agent of the insured.3 Most policies provide that, if any damage
suit be brought against the insured, immediate notice shall be
given the insurer, so that it can defend or settle the suit. During
these legal proceedings, the policyholder is prohibited from set-
tling the claim independently or in any way interfering with the
carrier's negotiations, except with consent of the carrier.
4
However, a conflict of interests may arise between insurer
and insured and, in such a situation, the insured should not be
required to act against his own interests, so long as his actions
are not illegal or unfair.5 Thus, where the insurer lacks an eco-
nomic motive for adequate defense of its insured, or when the
insurer and insured have other conflicting interests, the insurer
may not compel the policyholder to surrender control of the
* B.S., Temple University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 7A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4681 et seq. (rev. ed.
1962).
2 Ibid; see, Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Acci. and P. G. Ins. Co.,
240 F. 573 (C. C. A. Mass. 1917).
S Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1; see, Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins Co.,
204 Wis. 1, 231 N. W. 257 (1930).
4 Connolly v. Bolster, 187 Mass. 266, 72 N. E. 981 (1905).
5 Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1.
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litigation.6 Also, where any conflict exists and the insurer is
obligated to furnish the insured with an attorney, the counsel
appointed should not be associated with the attorney represent-
ing the insurance company.7 Some cases have held that clauses
in insurance contracts which require the insured to allow the
insurer's attorney to defend the claims insured against constitute
consent in advance by the insured to dual representation. How-
ever, the better view is that where a conflict develops between
the interests of the insured and those of the insurer, the insurer's
attorney must either withdraw entirely from the case or continue
to represent only one of the clients."
Situations may arise where the insured may refuse the at-
torney furnished him by his insurance carrier, even though such
refusal ordinarily would result in a breach of the insurance con-
tract, thereby relieving the insurer of its responsibility to appoint
counsel to defend the actionY It must be remembered that the
principal in the action, the insured, has the right to approve any
compromise, settlement, discontinuance or other disposition
thereof.' 0
Sometimes both the insurer and the insured will participate
in the defense of a suit brought against the policyholder, each
being represented by independent counsel. This situation arises
quite frequently where there are multiple grounds for liability
asserted, for some of which the insurer is liable, and for some of
which the insured is liable because they are not covered by his
policy. In such case, neither party has the right, without fault
by the other party, to exclude the other from participating in the
defense.1 Where it is uncertain whether a claim asserted against
an insured may or may not come within the scope of the policy
coverage, the insurer must undertake and continue the defense
6 Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 394 P. 2d 571
(1964).
7 Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1; see, Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d
148, 249 P. 2d 885 (1952).
8 Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 179 A. 2d 117
(1962).
9 Reynolds v. Maramorosch, 208 Misc. 626, 144 N. Y. S. 2d 900 (1955); Ross
v. Stricker, 85 Ohio App. 56, 88 N. E. 2d 80 (1949).
10 Reynolds v. Maramorosch, supra n. 9; Succession of Vlaho, 140 So. 2d
226 (C. A. P., La. 1962).
11 Krutsinger v. Illinois Cas. Co., 10 fli. 2d 518, 141 N. E. 2d 16 (1957); Fi-
delity and Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 208 Ky. 429, 271 S. W.
444 (1925).
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ATTORNEY APPOINTED BY INSURER
until it becomes certain that the claim is not covered by the pol-
icy, at which time the insurer may deny any obligation to defend
the policyholder.1 2
Where the litigation involves a collision between two ve-
hicles, the operators of each of which are insured by the same
insurance company, may the company, through counsel of its
choice, defend either or both of the operators? 13 In O'Morrow v.
Boradt 4 the California Supreme Court held that it is contrary
to public policy for one person, the insurance company, to control
both sides of litigation, and therefore the assureds were excused
from compliance with the cooperation clauses of their policies.' 5
This release of the contractual obligation to cooperate justifies
the insured's refusal to permit the insurer to make any defense
and to permit counsel appointed by the insurer to defend the
action.'6 It is evident that in these situations the conflict of in-
terest between the assured and the carrier is serious. It is to the
insurer's benefit to see that neither party recovers against the
other. Each of the assured parties may believe that he has a right
to an impartial jury determination.' 7 If the insurer can compel
the insured, under a cooperation clause, to furnish it with infor-
mation helping to defeat his own action, and control the conduct
of the litigation, it would be manifestly unfair and in violation of
public policy.' 8
It is submitted that the rationale and rule of the O'Morrow
case should not be followed. The insurance company should be
permitted to select separate counsel for each insured and to re-
12 Upper Columbia River Towing Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 313 F. 2d 702
(9th Cir. 1963); Lee v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 178 F. 2d 750 (2d Cir.
1949); Firco, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 343 P. 2d
311 (1959); Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 396 Pa. 582, 152 A. 2d
484 (1959); University Club v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 124 Pa.
Super. 480, 189 A. 534 (1937).
13 Casper, The Defense of Automobile Collision Cases By Insurers In Penn-
sylvania, 60 Dick. L. R. 171 (1956).
14 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P. 2d 483, 163 A. L. R. 894 (1946).
15 In addition to the release, the insurer has been held liable not only for
payment of any judgments obtained in the actions between the insureds,
but also for the fees of the parties' individual attorneys, such fees being
recoverable in place of the defense required by the contract. Ibid; Casper,
op. cit. supra n. 13.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid; Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1.
18 Ibid; Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility For Settlement, 67
Harv. L. R. 1136 (1953).
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quire the cooperation of each of them.19 Of course the insurer
must exercise the utmost good faith towards each policyholder
in conducting the defense;20 and, in view of the prospective con-
flict of interest in such a situation, it is incumbent upon the in-
surance company to inform its policyholders of its prospective
adverse interest.2 1 Each insured would then be entitled, at his
own and not at the insurer's expense, to retain his own counsel
who would be required to cooperate with counsel selected by the
insurer.22 This solution is a just and reasonable one. An insurer
cannot conduct a defense arbitrarily or capriciously with im-
punity, the relationship of the insurer and the insured requiring
the highest degree of good faith in the conduct of the defense.
23
As a matter of record, the attorney furnished by an insurer
would be the insured's attorney. However, as a matter of fact, he
would be the insurer's servant.2 4 The right of the insurer to ex-
clusively control the litigation against the insured is usually ac-
companied by a duty to defend the insured against all actions
brought against him on the allegation of facts and circumstances
which are covered by the policy even though such suits are
groundless, false, or fraudulent. 25 This obligation is one requiring
due care and utmost good faith.1
6
19 Casper, op. cit. supra n. 13.
20 Ibid; New York Consolidated R. Co. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 193 App.
Div. 438, 184 N. Y. S. 243 (1920); Perkoski v. Wilson, 371 Pa. 553, 92 A. 2d
189 (1952).
21 Ibid.
22 Casper, op. cit. supra n. 13.
23 New York Consolidated R. Co. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., and Perkoski
v. Wilson, supra n. 20; Weiner v. Targan, 100 Pa. Super. 278 (1930).
24 Petition of Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 273 App. Div. 993, 78 N. Y. S.
2d 674 (1948); Heller v. Alter, 143 Misc. 10, 255 N. Y. S. 627 (1932), revd. on
other gds. 143 Misc. 783, 257 N. Y. S. 391 (1932).
25 Sumner and Co. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 177 Misc. 887, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 2
(1942); West Philadelphia Stockyard Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 100 Pa.
Super. 459 (1930); Annot., 50 A. L. R. 2d 458 (1956); Annot., 29 A Am. Jur.
562 (1960); 45 C. J. S. 1055 (1946).
26 Moore v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 325 F. 2d 972 (10th Cir. 1963);
Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F. 2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962); Traders
and General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil and Gas Co., 129 F. 2d 621, 142 A. L. R.
799 (10th Cir. 1942).
May, 1965
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss2/14
ATTORNEY APPOINTED BY INSURER
Duty Owed-Conflict of Interest
An insurer's duty to defend is not an absolute obligation to
defend successfully. It is an obligation to contest the dispute to a
final judgment, 27 regardless of the amount involved and whether
or not it exceeds the insurer's liability,28 and to protect the policy-
holder as well as itself against liability at all stages of the litiga-
tion.29 Of course, a firm demand or claim may be made against
an insured for an amount in excess of policy coverage and in such
case, especially where the exposure may exceed policy coverage,
it is the duty of the insurer to disclose to its insured its limited
and perhaps adverse interest with respect to the extent of its
liability under the policy. It is imperative that such disclosure
be made in order that the insured may take steps to protect him-
self against the possible excess exposure by retaining personal
counsel.8 0 This problem will be discussed more fully below.
In conducting a defense, it is the duty of the insurer to act in
good faith,8' 1 and in a careful and prudent manner,32 giving to its
insured its undivided support. 38 Although, as was stated above,
it has been held that an insurer undertaking to defend an action
against its insured is in the position of an independent contrac-
tor,3 4 the better view is that it acts as an agent of the insured.35
Thus, when a conflict of interest arises between the insurer as
agent and the insured as principal, the insurer's conduct is sub-
27 Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1; Utilities Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 134 Tex.
640, 138 S. W. 2d 1062 (1940), revg. 117 S. W. 2d 486 (1938); see 45 C. J. S.,
op. cit. supra n. 25.
28 Pacific Indem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F. 2d 446, 131 A. L. R. 208 (9th Cir.
1939); see 45 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 25.
29 Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N. E. 2d 82
(1937); see 45 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 25.
30 Murach v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158 N. E. 2d 338
(1959); Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3; see 45 C. J. S.,
op. cit. supra n. 25.
31 Weiner v. Targan, supra n. 23; 45 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 25; Annot., 21
A. L. R. 766 (1922); Annot., 29 A Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 25.
32 Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil and Gas Co., supra n. 26;
Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Acci. and P. G. Ins. Co., 171 F. 495
(C. C. A. Tenn. 1909); Murray v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 61 Wash. 2d 618,
379 P. 2d 731 (1963); see 45 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 25.
3 Shehee-Ford Wagon and Harness Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 170 So.
249 (La. App. 1936); see 45 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 25.
34 Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Acci. and P. G. Ins. Co., supra
n. 2; Holmes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 190, 14 P. 2d 149 (1932); Appleman,
op. cit. supra n. 1.
35 Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil and Gas Co., supra n. 26; Hil-
ker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3; Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1.
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ject to closer scrutiny than that of the ordinary agent because of
its adverse interest.3 6
What facts must be considered by an insurer in determining
its obligation to assume the defense of a suit brought against its
insured by an injured party? The majority view is that if the
allegations of the complaint state a cause of action within the
coverage of the policy the insurance company must defend.
37
Such a rule advises the insurer at the beginning of the action that
a duty to defend exists. Difficulty arises, however, when the
allegations in the pleadings state facts which bring the injury
within an exception in the policy, and these facts are in contra-
diction to the facts known or which could be known to the in-
surer which do bring the injury within the policy coverage.38 Is
the company's duty to defend to be determined by the allegations
of the complaint alone, or by those facts not contained in the com-
plaint which would ordinarily come under the umbrella of policy
coverage? The effect of the so-called majority view is to allow
the insurer to ignore the true facts which are not stated in the
complaint but which are available to it and to rely solely upon
the plaintiff's allegations when determining the existence of its
duty to defend. 39 The rationale behind this rule seems to be that
the company should not be obligated to defend a suit against its
insured when the insurer would be under no obligation to pay
the judgment if the plaintiff's allegations prevail. 40
Those jurisdictions which oppose the majority view argue
that the insurance company is under a duty to investigate the
facts, even where the complaint, on its face, indicates that the
claim against the insured falls outside the policy coverage. 41
36 Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil and Gas Co., supra n. 26;
Annot., 29 A Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 25.
87 Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, supra n. 26; Lessack v. Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N. E. 2d 730 (1958); Wilson v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A. 2d 304 (1954); McMunn, Insurance-Duty To
Defend-Alleged Facts Not Within Policy Coverage, 65 W. Va. L. R. 175
(1962); Gerding, Insurance-Duty To Defend-Conflict of Interests, 3 Nat-
ural Resources J. 185 (1963); Annot., 50 A. L. R., op. cit. supra n. 25; Com-
ment, 30 N. Y. U. L. R. 1019 (1955); Comment, 103 U. Pa. L. R. 445 (1954).
38 McMunn, op. cit. supra n. 37.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid; Lessack v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., supra n. 37; Ocean Acci. and
Guar. Corp. v. Washington Brick and Terra Cotta Corp., 148 Va. 829, 139
S. E. 517 (1927).
41 McMunn, op. cit. supra n. 37; Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1; State v.
Bland, 354 Mo. 622, 190 S. W. 2d (1945).
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This view holds that the parties intended that the insurer should
not be permitted to ignore the actual facts (known to it or which
could be known to it from a reasonable investigation) thereby
placing the burden on the insured to prove coverage already
known to the insurer.42
Some policies provide indemnity for damage suffered by one
insured as the result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist.
Such provisions allow the insured to recover from his own in-
surance company whatever damages he could have recovered
from the uninsured motorist. In such cases, there is clearly a
conflict of interest between the insurance company and its as-
sured. The attorney for the insurance company has a dual role.
He owes a duty to the insured to see that he recovers damages
if he is free from negligence himself. On the other hand, he owes
a duty to his principal, the insurance company, to determine
whether or not the insured was negligent. If the insurer can
show negligence on the part of its insured, the provision in the
policy relating to indemnity for the negligence of the uninsured
motorist would not apply to the benefit of the insured. In view
of this conflict of interest, it would appear that the attorney for
the insurance company should advise the insured to engage sep-
arate counsel. 43 This would be in accord with the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association and of all
other bar associations. 44 In observing the admonition of the
Canon to avoid dual representation of conflicting interests, the
attorney, at the inception of his undertaking, must have in mind
not only the avoidance of a retainer which will obviously and
presently involve a duty to contend for one client what his duty
to the other presently requires him to oppose, but also the proba-
42 Ibid; Gerding, op. cit. supra n. 37; Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hilder-
brandt, 119 F. 2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941); Loftin v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga.
App. 287, 127 S. E. 2d 53 (1962).
43 American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, 205 Misc.
1066, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 393 (1954); Notes A. B. A. J. 945 (Oct. 1964).
44 Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, provides in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the
client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any
interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence
the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by ex-
press consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting in-
terests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
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bility or possibility that such a situation may develop later.45 The
Canons make it clear that there are not two standards, one apply-
ing to counsel privately retained by a client, and the other to
counsel paid by an insurance carrier.46
The chief purpose of this rule of professional conduct relat-
ing to an attorney's acceptance of employment adverse to his
client or former client is to protect the confidential relationship
existing between attorney and client.47 As was ably stated in
American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties,48
quoting from the case of Loew v. Gillespie: 49
The relation of attorney to client is a high trust. Not
only may he do nothing adverse to his client, but he may
accept no retainer to do anything which might be adverse
to his client's interests. These principles must be regarded
as the foundation of all the rules which the courts and the
leaders of the legal profession have announced as fixing the
proper relations of attorneys and clients. Public policy abso-
lutely demands that these foundations be not weakened. The
essential question in each case is whether or not the attorney
has accepted a retainer which is in any manner in conflict
with his obligation to some other client.50
Whenever there is the possibility of an excess judgment,
ethical problems are created for the attorney who represents the
assured under the insurance policy. The insurance company at-
torney who accepts such employment must be very careful in his
handling of the case. He must first ask himself: Whom do I
represent? Do I represent the insured or do I represent the in-
surer? If I represent both, at what point must I cease to continue
45 Ibid.
46 American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, supra n. 43;
Canon 45 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, provides:
The canons of the American Bar Association apply to all branches
of the legal profession; specialists in particular branches are not to be
considered as exempt from the application of these principles.
47 Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 188, 218 Cal. App. 2d 24 (1963);
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5, West's Annot. Bus. and Prof. Code
following Sec. 6076.
48 Supra n. 43.
49 90 Misc. 616, 619, 153 N. Y. S. 830 (1915), affd. 173 App. Div. 889, 157
N. Y. S. 1133 (1916).
50 See also, McLure v. Donovan, 82 Cal. App. 2d 664, 186 P. 2d 718 (1943);
Spadaro v. Palmisano, 109 So. 2d 418 (Fla. C. A. 1959); Crum v. Anchor
Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 119 N. W. 2d 703 (1963); Newcomb v. Meiss, 263
Minn. 315, 116 N. W. 2d 593 (1962); Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349
P. 2d 430 (1960); Pacific Coast Cement Co. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of
N. Y., 173 Wash. 534, 23 P. 2d 890 (1933).
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to do so? 51 It has been held in such situations, that after counsel
has been retained by the insurer and has appeared for the in-
sured in the action, the primary interest of the attorney is to
represent the insured;52 his allegiance is to him and he may not
represent any other interest that may be adverse.53 The state-
ment of principles with respect to the practice of law formulated
by representatives of the American Bar Association and various
insurance companies expressly provides:
4 (b). The companies and their representatives, includ-
ing attorneys, will inform the policyholder of the progress
of any suit against the policyholder and its probable results.
If any diversity of interest shall appear between the pol-
icyholder and the company, the policyholder shall be fully
advised of the situation and invited to retain his own coun-
sel . . .
5 4
If the attorney feels that the insured may suffer personal
loss as a result of a course of conduct which he, as an attorney,
is pursuing, full and complete information must be given to the
assured.55 Some of the cases have gone so far as to hold that if
counsel has reason to believe that the discharge of his duties will
produce a conflict of interest, it becomes incumbent upon him to
terminate his relationship with the client whose interests would
prevent counsel from devoting his entire energies in that client's
behalf.56 The insured, as a client, may presume from his attor-
ney's silence on the matter that the attorney has no interest
which will interfere with his devotion to the cause confided in
him, and that the attorney has no interest which may betray his
judgment or endanger his fidelity.57
51 Appleman, The Relation Of Trial Counsel To The Public, 61 W. Va. L. R.
260 (1959).
52 Jackson v. Trapier, 42 Misc. 2d 139, 247 N. Y. S. 2d 315 (1964); Reynolds
v. Maramorosch, supra n. 9; Johnston, Family Law, 31 N. Y. U. L. R. 368,
380 (1956).
53 Ibid; cf., Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mass. 494, 156 N. E. 2d 44 (1959); Helm v.
Inter-Ins. Exchange For Auto. Club of Mo., 354 Mo. 935, 192 S. W. 2d 417,
167 A. L. R. 238 (1946); see, 7 C. J. S. 823 (1937).
54 Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 51; Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18; Anderson v.
Eaton, 211 Cal. 113; 293 P. 788 (1930); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App.
2d 44, 149 N. E. 2d 482 (1958); Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 146 N. E. 321
(1924); Anderson and Ireland Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 123 Md. 67, 90 A. 780
(1914).
55 Ibid.
56 Hammett v. McIntyre, supra n. 7; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, supra n. 54;
Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 51.
57 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, supra n. 54; Hunter v. Troup, supra n. 54.
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If an attorney appointed by the carrier represents the in-
sured and has acted in such a manner as to constitute a breach
of the ethical duties which he owes to the insured, then he may
be subject to disbarment proceedings and he may be exposed
to personal liability for loss resulting to the insured during the
course of the representation.58 Of course, if there is no ethical
breach, but a question of judgment involved, the attorney repre-
senting the insured may not be so endangered; 59 however, in
each situation, it must be evident that the attorney acted in the
best interests of the insured as well as in the best interests of the
insurer.60
The attorney appointed by an insurer to defend its insured
is not required to participate in, or aid in, the perpetration of a
fraud. If the attorney has knowledge that the insured is perpe-
trating a fraud upon the insurance company through collusion
with the plaintiff in the action, it is counsel's duty, as an officer
of the court, to withdraw from further proceedings in the action
in order that the insured may retain other counsel.6 1
The defense attorney engaged in defending a personal injury
action should insist upon a full and efficiently conducted investi-
gation; keep abreast of developments of a medico-legal nature; 62
have some knowledge of anatomy, cell, tissue and organ func-
tions; the spine and its injuries and degenerative diseases; 63 in
order to evaluate a claim for reserve or settlement purposes,64
and make proper recommendation as to settlement or refusal
thereof.65 Finally, defense counsel must at all times exercise the
utmost good faith and fidelity toward the client.66
58 Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 51; see 7 C. J. S. 823 (1937).
59 Ibid.
60 Id.
61 Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 143 P. 2d 940 (1943); Spadaro v.
Palmisano, supra n. 50; Schwartz v. Sar Corp., 19 Misc. 2d 660, 195 N. Y. S.
2d 496 (1959); Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
62 1 Defense L. J. 23 (1957).
63 Ibid at 79.
64 9 Id. at 380 (1961).
65 Id.
66 1 id. at 79 (1957); Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 51.
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Settlement of Suits
Liability insurance policies ordinarily reserve to the insurer
the decision whether the claimant's offer of compromise will be
accepted.67 A conflict of interest may arise between the insured
and the insurer where the amount sought is in excess of the
policy coverage and an offer is made by the injured claimant to
compromise the claim for an amount within the limit of the cov-
erage.68 The insurer may insist that it has the sole and exclusive
right to control the litigation and may refuse to accept the offer.
On the other hand, if the insured is aware of the offer, he may
insist that the insurer accept it, or take steps to negotiate for a
settlement as to his excess exposure.69 What must the insurer
do, what steps must he take, and whose interests must he serve?
Can the insurer become liable to the policyholder if it fails to
settle and later the insured is faced with a judgment in excess of
the policy limits? 70
The general rule is that a liability insurer is required to
exercise good faith in protecting the interest of its insured where
an offer is made to compromise a claim against the latter within
the policy limits.71 In some jurisdictions, however, the insurer
may be held liable for the amount of a recovery against the in-
sured in excess of the policy limits, not because of the insurer's
lack of good faith, but because of negligence in rejecting the
offer.72
67 Baker v. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co., 22 Wis. 2d 77, 125 N. W. 2d 370
(1963); Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3; Annot., 6 Am.
Jur., Proofs of Facts 415 (1960); Annot., 5 A Am. Jur. 115 (1956); Annot.,
40 A. L. R. 168 (1926).
68 Ibid.
69 Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 51; Braidwood, Settlement-The Insurer's
Dilemma, 3 Alberta L. R. 250 (1964).
70 Ibid.
71 Klingman v. National Indem. Co., 317 F. 2d 850 (7th Cir. 1963); Tully v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 568 (N. D. Fla. 1954); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Gordon, 95 F. 2d 605 (10th Cir. 1938); Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215
Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1963); Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw,
134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938); Rudisill v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 York 133
(Pa. Com. P1. 1962); Baker v. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co., supra n. 67;
Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 67; Braidwood, op. cit.
supra n. 69; Annot., 6 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot.,
5 A Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 40 A. L. R., op. cit. supra n. 67.
72 Tully v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra n. 71; Anderson v. Southern Surety Co.,
107 Kan. 375, 191 P. 583 (1920); Annot., 6 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, op. cit.
supra n. 67; Annot., 5 A Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 40 A. L. R.,
op. cit. supra n. 67.
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Once the good faith rule or the negligence rule is considered,
a second problem arises as to how much consideration the insurer
may give to its own interests as opposed to the interests of the
insured. Generally, the insurer is required to give as much
weight to the policyholder's interests as it gives to its own.7 3
The decision to try or settle a case is likely to be the joint
decision of a responsible claims representative or officer of the
insurance company and the attorney who is duly authorized to
make the settlement.7 4 In addition, where by the terms of the
policy, the insurer is given the right to control the settlement of
any claims within the coverage of the policy, the relationship of
principal and agent is created between the insured and the in-
surer, and the insurer's duty as agent is of a fiduciary nature,
subject to the strictest scrutiny.75 When counsel is appointed by
the insurer he assumes the same duties which the insurance com-
pany owes to the insured, and is therefore in the position of
representing clients with conflicting interests. 76 It is improper
for the attorney to communicate with the insured on the subject
of settlement without first advising his principal, the insurance
company, and obtaining its consent to communication of the offer
to the insured.77
Where the attorney appointed by the insurer has a duty re-
garding the settlement decision, the standard for defining that
duty is more severe than that applied in favor of the policyholder
against the insurance company.78 The standard for judging the
insurer's conduct is sometimes stated in terms of the ordinarily
prudent person concerned with the management of his own af-
fairs.7 9 However, an ordinarily prudent person would be less fa-
73 Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co. of N. Y., 196 F. 2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); Kelley
v. British Commercial Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Cal. App. 1963); Braid-
wood, op. cit. supra n. 69; Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
74 Griffith v. Frankfort General Ins. Co., 34 N. D. 540, 159 N. W. 19 (1916);
Cunningham, Liability Beyond Policy Limits, 25 Tenn. L. R. 432 (1957);
Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
75 Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, 225 F. Supp. 222 (N. D. Tex. 1963); Fidelity
and Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Robb, 267 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959).
76 Cunningham, op. cit. supra n. 74; Keeton, op cit. supra n. 18.
77 Ibid; Annot., 6 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 5 A
Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 40 A. L. R., op. cit. supra n. 67; Canon
6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, op. cit. supra n. 44; Perkoski v. Wil-
son, supra n. 20.
78 Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
79 Ibid; Dumas v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 56 A. 2d 57 (N. H. 1947);
G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S. W. 2d 544 (Tex.
(Continued on next page)
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miliar with settlement negotiations and values than would an
ordinarily prudent attorney, and it is arguable that the standard
for judging the attorney's conduct should be defined in terms of
an attorney specializing in personal injury litigation. 0
The attorney must give a bona fide opinion to his principal,
the insurance carrier, based on all of the liability factors of the
case, whether to compromise and settle, or to defend.81 If the in-
surer, or its appointed attorney, does not exercise good faith in
protecting the interest of the insured, where an offer is made to
compromise the claim within the policy limits, the insurer may
be held liable to its insured for all damages set in the verdict,
even though above the policy limits, because of its failure to
exercise good faith in protecting the interest of the insured.8 2 If
the offer, which has been rejected by the insurer on the advice
of appointed counsel, had been fully and fairly considered in the
light of all relevant evidence, and the rejection was based on an
honest belief that the insured had a strong defense or that the
verdict could be kept within the policy limits, the fact that this
judgment is later proved mistaken does not amount to a lack of
good faith.83 Bad faith may be shown by the fact that the evi-
dence as to liability and damage was strongly against the insured
so that there was no fair or reasonable prospect of escaping li-
ability or holding the recovery within the limits of the policy.8 4
Bad faith may also be predicated on the failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the claim, thus rendering it unable to in-
telligently assess the probabilities of recovery against the in-
(Continued from preceding page)
Comm. App. 1929); cf., Wilson v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 145 Me. 370,
76 A. 2d 111 (1950); Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3.
80 Baker v. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co., supra n. 67; Hilker v. Western
Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3; Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
81 Baker v. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co., supra n. 67; Hilker v. Western Au-
tomobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3; Annot., 6 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, op. cit.
supra n. 67; Annot., 5 A Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 40 A. L. R.,
op. cit. supra n. 67.
82 Ibid.; Christian v. Preferred Acci. Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 888 (N. D. Cal.
1950); Best Building Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160
N. E. 911 (1928); Braidwood, op. cit. supra n. 69.
83 General Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Whipple, 328 F. 2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964); Annot.,
6 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 5 A Am. Jur., op.
cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 40 A. L. R., op. cit. supra n. 67.
84 Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., supra n. 71; Kelley v. British Commer-
cial Ins. Co., supra n. 73; Brunswick Realty Co. v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 99
Misc. 639, 166 N. Y. S. 36 (1917).
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sured. 5 An insurer's rejection of the advice of its own attorneys
to settle a case is evidence of bad faith in failing to compromise
a claim against the insured.8 6
Difficulties are compounded in this area of settlement when
there are assertive multiple claimants, with whom the insurer
makes settlements, and subsequently discovers other later claims,
the total of which would exceed the policy limits. Should the
insurer, in such a situation, be liable in excess of the policy
limits?8 7 Generally, the courts have encouraged settlements,
which prevent unnecessary litigation and the congestion of court
lists and eliminate many of the problems in actions.8  It has been
held that an insurer, which has settled in good faith and without
negligence with some of the claimants in an action against the
insured, is liable to subsequent claimants only for the amount
by which its maximum liability under the policy exceeds the
amounts of the settlements previously made, such excess to be
paid to the subsequent claimants pro rata to the amounts of their
judgments.8 9
Another difficulty may arise in this area of settlement where
the attorney for the insurer advises his principal, the insurance
company, to settle with the party claiming against the insured,
and the insurer does so settle with the claimant. The settlement
may be held to constitute a bar to the insured's tort action against
the person receiving the settlement. In this situation, the attor-
ney may have prejudiced and harmed his own client, the in-
sured.9 0 However, the courts which have considered the question
are agreed that a liability insurer's settlement of a claim against
its insured, made without the insured's consent or despite his
protests of nonliability, and not thereafter ratified by him, will
not ordinarily bar an action by the insured against the person
85 Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962); Sowder v. Lawrence,
129 Kan. 135, 281 P. 921 (1929); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 108 Vt.
269, 187 A. 788 (1936).
86 Royal Transit v. Central Surety and Ins. Corp., 168 F. 2d 345 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. den. 335 U. S. 844, 69 S. Ct. 68, 93 L. Ed. 395 (1948); Olympia
Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N. E.
2d 896 (1945).
87 Braidwood, op. cit. supra n. 69; see also Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
88 Bennett v. Conrady, 180 Kan. 485, 305 P. 2d 823 (1957).
89 Ibid.; Alford Textile Ins. Co., 248 N. C. 224, 103 S. E. 2d 8 (1958); Braid-
wood, op. cit. supra n. 69; Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
90 Annot., 6 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 5 A Am.
Jur., op. cit. supra n. 67; Annot., 40 A. L. R., op cit. supra n. 67.
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receiving the settlement, on a claim arising out of the same set of
facts.91
Negligence in Defense of Suits
Where an insurer assumes the defense of a suit against the
insured it owes the duty to exercise not only good faith, but also
ordinary care and reasonable diligence in conducting such de-
fense and is liable in tort for the excess over the coverage of the
policy of a judgment recovered by an injured person against the
insured by reason of the insurer's negligence in performing such
duty.92 As was stated above, the insurer is bound to exercise that
degree of care which a man of ordinary prudence would exercise
in the management of his own affairs. Failure to meet this stand-
ard will result in liability to the insured for the excess of the
judgment over the policy limits, irrespective of any fraud or bad
faith.93 In such case the insurer's liability is not confined to the
monetary limits of the policy, and, while having some relation to
the policy, is not a contractual right growing out of the policy,
but a tort liability for violation of a duty owed to the insured.
94
The duty sued upon by the insured arises, not upon the bringing
of the suit against the insured, but out of the act of the insurer in
undertaking the defense, whether obligated to do so by the policy
or not.9 5
Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish the bad
faith of an insurer. The insurer's negligence in investigation, in
91 Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J. Super. 95, 86 A. 2d 695 (1952); Barron v.
Smith, 33 Erie Co. L. J. 1541 (Pa. 1949); Annot., 32 A. L. R. 2d 937 (1953).
92 Ballard v. Ocean Acci. and Guarantee Co., 86 F. 2d 449 (7th Cir. 1936);
Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Acci. and P. G. Ins. Co., supra n.
32; Schwartz v. Sar Corp., supra n. 61; American Employers Ins. Co. v.
Goble Aircraft Specialties, supra n. 43; Ross v. Stricker, supra n. 9; J.
Spang Baking Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 577, 68 N. E.
2d 122 (1946); Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1; Annot., 29 A Am. Jur., op. cit.
supra n. 25; 45 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 25; Annot., 131 A. L. R. 1499 at 1510
(1941).
93 Ballard v. Ocean Acci. and Guarantee Co., supra n. 102; Attleboro Mfg.
Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Acci. and P. G. Ins. Co., supra n. 32; Hilker v.
Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3; Stilwell v. Parsons, 51 Del. 342,
145 A. 2d 397 (1958); Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1; Annot., 131 A. L. R.,
op. cit. supra n. 102.
94 Chittick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 276 (D. Del.
1958); Duncan v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 91 N. H. 349, 23 A. 2d 325
(1941); Stilwell v. Parsons, supra n. 103; Southern Fire and Cas. Co. v.
Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S. W. 2d 785 (1952).
95 Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Acci. and P. G. Ins. Co., supra
n. 32; Annot., 131 A. L. R., op. cit. supra n. 102.
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failing to prepare a defense properly, in failing to produce avail-
able evidence, in failing to keep the insured advised, are all
suggestive of indifference to the trust imposed by the policy and
the representation which, in turn, may raise an inference of bad
faith.9 6 However, where the insurer asserts a defense in good
faith, a reasonable doubt existing as to its validity, while a negli-
gent failure to use proper care in the preparation of the case
would constitute a breach of contract giving rise to a tort liability
for breach of duty, the insurer is not liable beyond the limits of
the policy. 7 The fact that the insurer was unsuccessful in the
trial of the case is not sufficient by itself to show that the defense
of the action brought against the insured was not made in good
faith.98 However, the fact that personal counsel appears for the
insured, as well as company employed counsel, does not excuse
the insurer for the errors of the attorney employed by it.9 9 In
Appleman's opinion, 100 these rules do not clearly state the re-
sponsibility devolving upon an insurer under modern conditions.
He states:
It has more than the duty of the care of an ordinary man
unskilled in litigation; it must exercise more than mere good
faith. It is a professional which advertises by all media of
mass communication its skill in the investigation, settlement,
and litigation of liability cases. It then becomes chargeable
with a greater duty-even as the brain surgeon must exer-
cise greater knowledge, judgment, and skill in a brain opera-
tion than would a general practitioner of medicine. It must
use skill diligently and adequately to investigate a case, it
must use skill in negotiation, it must select skilled trial
counsel-not the lowest priced member of the bar-and that
individual, so selected by it, may bind the insurer by his
derelictions. 10 1
96 Ibid.; Southern Fire and Cas. Co. v. Norris, supra n. 104; Hilker v. West-
ern Automobile Ins. Co., supra n. 3.
97 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Skaggs, 251 F. 2d 356 (10th Cir. 1957);
Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1.
98 Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co. of N. Y., supra n. 73.
99 Ibid.; Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1.
100 Appleman, op. cit. supra n. 1.
101 Dempsey, Excess Liability, 19 Insur. Counsel J. 44 at 58 (1952); Cun-
ningham, op. cit. supra n. 74; Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 18.
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